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24 March 1986

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--  
ANIO/SP, 21 March 1986

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1. I met with [ ] in his office and gave him the background to the force multiplier study. He said that during the time that he was an assistant to the DCI, Mr. Casey and John McMahon frequently used the phrase in their discussions about the intelligence budget with Secretary Weinberger, Taft, and other senior DoD officials. [ ] commented that good intelligence, however, might also uncover new threats that would, in turn, require more military capability--an effect just the opposite of what is intended by the force multiplier concept.

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2. [ ] provided three examples in the strategic area of how one might demonstrate the validity of the concept:

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Mobile missiles. As intelligence becomes better able to provide details about their locations, the need for "barrage attack" (using a lot more weapons than are now available) is lessened.

Deep underground facilities (the large national command bunkers and the like in the Moscow area). As our knowledge about these improves, fewer weapons may be needed for their targetting.

Soviet perceptions of US targetting practices, i.e., our understanding of how the Soviets view our targetting of their missile silos. This could lead to the conclusion that the Soviets do not see the need to super-harden their missile silos. And this also would carry implications for the size of the US strategic offensive force.

3. [ ] said that the force multiplier study could be used with great effect not only with Secretary Weinberger, but with the Congress as well. He also saw it as fitting Mr. Casey's drive for excellence. In this connection, it could be used in training programs for new analysts and others who would be getting a message something like, "not only will you be contributing to the security of the country, but you will be aiding in savings of a lot of bucks."

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4. [ ] concluded that the study was a good one. He said that he would brief Larry Gershwin about it and try to get some ideas from him on approaches to be taken. In the meantime he said he would give more thought to the issue and pass on whatever else comes to mind that might be useful.

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